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Introduction
When considered from today’s vantage point, attempts to create cohesive nation-
states through forced migration and/or assimilation of peoples come across as 
sources of insecurity for all those affected (Krishna 1999). However, in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both forced migration and assimilation 
were adopted as conflict-regulation measures. The assumption was that ‘cohesive’ 
nation-states would be less conflict-prone than others (see Joenniemi Chapter 7). 
Authors of the Lausanne Treaty (1923) between Turkey and the European great 
powers adopted such an understanding of conflict regulation when they agreed 
on exchanging population between Greece and Turkey. In the following years 
Turkey’s Republican leaders engaged in various spatial, economic and cultural 
practices in the attempt to create a ‘cohesive’ body politic. In this chapter, we 
highlight multiple in/securities experienced by myriad peoples in Turkey – 
including those who were forced to migrate and others who were encouraged to 
assimilate in the early Republican period. Different from other accounts that have 
focused on insecurities of those who were forced to immigrate or those who were 
encouraged to assimilate (see Çelik Chapter 3), we also look at the experiences 
of ‘model citizens’ of the Republic, those who were fully integrated (and/or 
assimilated). We utilize the concept of ‘ontological (in)security’ in accounting for 
the experiences of this latter group who, we argue, were also in/secured as they 
became less able to live with ‘difference’.
We differ from the literature in another, equally important, sense. Different 
from those who look at this period in black-and-white terms (i.e. some were 
secured while others were insecured), we highlight in various shades grey, i.e. 
multiple in/securities experienced by myriad peoples. In offering this argument, 
we draw on critical approaches to security that understand the term ‘(in)securing’ 
to invoke a reflexive notion of security, cognizant of the ways in which our 
security practices produce insecurity as well as security, for ourselves and for 
others (Booth 1997; Bigo 2008; Burgess 2011). Through offering a reading of 
Turkey’s early Republican (1923–1946) citizenship practices as (in)securing 
peoples, we explore how becoming citizens of a modern nation-state generates 
both security and insecurity for individuals and social groups – albeit in different 
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ways.2 As such, our analysis of the consequences of the Treaty of Lausanne and 
the new Republic’s citizenship regime highlights their implications in terms of 
both securing and insecuring.
In offering this argument, we introduce a threefold categorization that 
distinguishes between those who were not a part of the citizenship regime 
(those who were ‘excluded’ via Lausanne); those who were (in)secured as they 
approximated the citizen imaginary of the nation-state (the ‘included’); and those 
who were a part of the citizenship regime but were (in)secured by virtue of late(r) 
or limited access to full citizenship rights and/or lack of sense of empowerment to 
or experience in exercising those rights (‘the included/excluded’; i.e. those whose 
insecurities the literature has focused upon). In considering the ‘included’, we 
highlight how it was not only governmental practices per se but also the limits 
of recognition and respect for ‘difference’ in Turkey’s citizen imaginary that 
constituted the bounds of their (in)security (as well as the ‘included/excluded’ 
and the ‘excluded’). While it may come across as counterintuitive to consider 
the ‘included’ as insecure, they, too, have experienced ontological (in)security in 
unexpected (and heretofore unacknowledged) ways.
Section I introduces the argument and elaborates on the notions of inclusion 
and exclusion beyond their customary understandings. Section II analyses 
governmental practices of citizenship during the early Republican period by looking 
at the spatial, economic and cultural aspects of a body of practices that sought to 
create a modern nation-state and a unified body of citizens to populate this state. 
These practices have secured all citizens through the building of a modern nation-
state amidst the ruins of a fallen empire. Myriad citizens were insecured as these 
very measures narrowed the limits of recognition of and respect for ‘difference’. 
Insecurities of the included/excluded are widely recognized in the literature (see 
also Çelik Chapter 3), whereas two aspects remain underemphasized: that the 
same peoples were both secured and insecured (although in different ways); and 
that the ‘included’ were also in/secured – not in material but ontological terms. 
Section III highlights ontological (in)security of the ‘included’. Here we also point 
to the agency of the ‘included’ to highlight how they played a role in insecuring 
fellow citizens as they became less able to live with ‘difference’.
From subjecthood to citizenship: a process of (in)securing
The institution of citizenship regimes against the background of decaying empires 
or colonial regimes is invariably celebrated as a moment of security. Be that as it 
may, such periods of transition from subjecthood to citizenship are riddled with 
insecurities. Writing about post-colonial contexts, Mahmood Mamdani (1996) has 
argued that the transition from colonial subjects to citizens of newly established 
nation-states has, on the one hand, allowed recognition of individual rights and 
liberties while, on the other hand, circumscribed those rights through categories 
and institutions that were remnants of the colonial machinery. Turkey’s citizens, 
too, were (in)secured as part of the transition from subjecthood to citizenship. The 
new Republic’s citizen imaginary secured peoples as citizens of an independent 
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and sovereign nation-state. No longer were they subjects of an empire; nor did 
they face the danger of being subjected to the indirect rule or mandate regimes of 
European great powers. The Republic’s citizen imaginary also insecured peoples 
by limiting recognition and respect for difference.
Different from those post-colonial contexts that Mamdani has focused upon, 
what subverted peoples’ citizenship rights in Turkey during the period under 
consideration was the Republican leaders’ sense of insecurity vis-à-vis international 
society. The Republic of Turkey was established on 29 October 1923 against the 
background of the decline and fall of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1919) and the 
‘war of national liberation’ (1919–1922) waged against the European great powers 
that sought to incorporate Ottoman territories into their own domains following 
World War I (WWI). Accordingly, a sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the international 
society was not unfounded in that Turkey had just come out of a destructive war 
of liberation fought against European great powers and their regional proxies. 
Seeking solace in independence and development, they sought to strengthen the 
newly founded nation-state both as an idea and as an institution, internally and 
internationally. On 20 April 1924, the Grand National Assembly of the Republic 
of Turkey (GNA) adopted its first constitution. Governing citizenship was Article 
No.88: ‘The people of Turkey, regardless of their religion and race, are Turkish 
in terms of citizenship’. Sloganized as ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, the 
citizen imaginary of this period glossed over ethnic and/or religious differences in 
the hope that virtuous citizens of the Republic would be inspired to unify.
Put differently, what (in)secured Turkey’s citizens at the time was the perceived 
need to seek security through producing a cohesive body of citizens modelled 
on the other nation-states of the time. Indeed, Turkey’s citizenship practices in 
the early Republican era cannot be understood in isolation from the international 
and historical context. They were not uncharacteristic of the time in that other 
emerging nation-states engaged in similar practices during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.3 The basis of Turkey’s citizenship regime, i.e. seeking to 
establish a nation-state on the basis of exclusive notions of religious, ethnic and/
or national identity was also shared by international society and not merely newly 
established states (as with India, see Krishna 1999).
The state-directed movement of ethnic groups was employed at the time as a 
form of conflict regulation (McGarry & O’Leary 1994). One of the most important 
techniques for regulating conflict was to move ethnic groups. Treaties ending the 
wars of this era invariably included clauses governing population exchanges. 
Groups that were considered to be (potentially) disloyal were relocated from one 
part of the state to another or were expelled from the state altogether (McGarry 
1998, p.613). Those who were not forced to emigrate fled soon after. During 
1918–1923, the Ottoman Empire received refugees arriving from the Balkan 
and Caucasian states and Russia (Shaw 1998). Most immigrants Turkey received 
between and 1923 and 1950 were objects of demographic engineering practices 
of the Balkan states (Tekeli 1990).
The Lausanne Treaty was designed with the same rationale in mind. The 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey (the so-called Mübadele) was 
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approved by the European international society as a breakthrough attempt at 
conflict regulation (Beeley 1978; McGarry 1998; McGarry & O’Leary 1994). 
The point being that we do not mean to judge the early Republican citizenship 
regime for its imperfect politics of difference. Rather we insist that the Republican 
leaders’ choice for this particular citizen imaginary over other possibilities should 
be considered in the context of the notions and practices of citizenship, security 
and conflict regulation that prevailed at the time. As will be seen below, various 
insecurities that unfolded since then have laid bare the poverty of searching for 
security based on pre-given and exclusive notions of identity as such.
Prevailing accounts look at Turkey’s early citizenship regime in one of two 
ways: by focusing on the founding texts such as the 1924 Constitution, or by 
focusing on identity politics. Those who focus on founding texts of the Republic 
point to the 1924 Constitution as marking a moment of security on account of 
having transformed subject peoples (of the Ottoman Empire) into citizens (of the 
Republic of Turkey) (Kili & Gözübüyük 2000; Kili 1969; cf. Bayır 2010). Indeed, 
Article No.88 of the 1924 Constitution made a break with the Ottoman past and 
laid the foundations of a citizenship regime. While a significant number of non-
Muslims had, by then, left for Greece as part of the Mübadele, the remaining 
Greek Orthodox, Jewish and Armenian Orthodox peoples were formally included 
in the new citizenship regime as ‘minority’ citizens with equal rights.4 As such, the 
citizenship regime of the Republic included all those who lived within its territorial 
boundaries (with the exception of foreign nationals). Article No.88 was almost 
entirely adopted from the 1876 Constitution of the Ottoman Empire that read 
‘People of the Ottoman Empire, regardless of their religion and race, are Ottoman 
tebaa [subjects]’. The difference between the two constitutions was unmistakable. 
The qualifier ‘in terms of citizenship’ was absent from the 1876 Constitution.
Those accounts that focus on founding texts of the Republic acknowledge that 
there emerged a gap between what the 1924 Constitution laid down on paper 
and citizenship practices of this era. They nevertheless explain this gap as having 
been caused by the aberrations of some policy-makers, that is, exceptions to an 
otherwise inclusive citizenship regime (Kili 1984; Kili 2003; Kili & Gözübüyük 
2000).
Those accounts that focus on identity politics have, in turn, maintained that 
there is an exclusionary pattern to the above-mentioned practices (Yumul 1998; 
Caymaz 2007; Yeğen 2009). Accordingly they have viewed the early Republican 
period as a process of insecuring of some. Such practices included the withholding 
of women’s political rights until 1934; barring of non-Turkish speakers from 
government and private sector employment for many years; subjecting minority 
citizens to discriminatory treatment in war-time taxation and conscription; (re)
settling immigrants and citizens in line with statist security concerns.
As such, those accounts focusing on identity politics have considered 
insecurities of some but not all citizens. Furthermore, they viewed these practices 
as products of demographic engineering practices of successive governments 
but not as outcomes of a process of state-building and development whereby all 
citizens were secured and insecured in myriad ways.
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In an attempt to go beyond the prevailing accounts that explain the citizens’ 
predicament as mere aberrations of some policy-makers or demographic 
engineering, we offer a framework that focuses on the citizenship practices of 
state and non-state actors and highlights the multiple ways in which Turkey’s 
peoples were (in)secured. The argument here is that the citizenship regime of the 
period should be analysed not as a moment of security for all citizens (as accounts 
that focus on the founding texts argue) or as a process of insecuring of some (as 
argued by those accounts that focus on identity politics) but a process of (in)
securing for all citizens.
In considering myriad insecurities experienced by Turkey’s citizens, we draw 
upon Étienne Balibar’s (2005, 2008) elaboration on the notions of ‘inclusion’ and 
‘exclusion’, offered against the background of the French banlieue riots in 2005. 
Dismissing media representation of rioters, who were mostly of North African 
immigrant origin, as ‘excluded’, Balibar emphasized that the rioters were not 
excluded insofar as their political and social rights were defined on paper. They 
were nonetheless excluded from the public sphere by virtue of a lack of sense of 
empowerment and/or experience in exercising those rights.
In the specific context of Turkey, the best-known instance of ‘exclusion’ is 
the Mübadele (population exchange) treaty between Turkey and Greece in 1923 
whereby Greek Orthodox Christians from Turkey left for Greece, and Muslims 
from Greece arrived in Anatolia. While the literature has emphasized the 
predicament of those who were ‘excluded’, the experiences of citizens who were 
(in)secured as they were included have largely gone under-examined.5
Drawing upon Balibar, the chapter offers a threefold categorization that 
distinguishes between those who were excepted through the Mübadele of 1923 
and not accorded citizenship (‘the excluded’); those citizens who approximated 
the citizen imaginary by learning to check their differences at the door but in 
the process were (in)secured as they became unable to live with difference (‘the 
included’); and those citizens who were (in)secured through late(r) access to 
various rights and/or lack of sense of empowerment or experience in exercising 
such rights (‘the included/excluded’). This more nuanced categorization allows 
us to analyse the ways in which Turkey’s peoples were (in)secured, in different 
ways, as they sought to approximate or resist the citizen imaginary of the early 
Republican period. As will be discussed in Section II, insecurities of the ‘included/
excluded’ were caused by economic, spatial and societal practices of successive 
governments. Insecurities of the ‘included’, in turn, could be better understood 
as ontological (in)security. The latter have been (in)secured as they became less-
than-able to live with difference and, in some cases, (in)secured their fellow 
citizens.
In/securing the included/excluded: governmental practices
In Turkey, the process of (re)territorialization of identity began with the 
declaration of Misak-ı Milli (National Covenant)6 in 1920, was sealed into law 
with the 1924 constitution, and written into space during early years of the 
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Republic. A key spatial practice of this period is invariably considered to be the 
Mübadele (population exchange) agreement with Greece. Whereas the Mübadele 
did not constitute a moment of security for those who were not excluded – as 
those accounts focusing on the inclusion/exclusion binary assume. Rather, the 
Mübadele marked the beginning of a process of (in)securing, which included the 
passing of various laws governing who would be allowed to emigrate to Turkey 
and where citizens would (re)settle; erasing remnants of past inhabitants through 
settling the muhacir (immigrants) in places vacated by the Armenian and Greek 
Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire; and the changing of place 
names throughout Anatolia.
To start with the Mübadele, the population exchange agreement between 
Greece and Turkey was concluded on 30 January 1923, six months prior to the 
signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. Article No.1 of the agreement stipulated that 
the Greek Orthodox Christians living in Turkey would be exchanged with the 
Muslims living in Greece starting from May 1923. A further provision was that 
neither group would be allowed to return to their former places of residence 
without the permission of the respective governments. The agreement specifically 
exempted from the exchange those Greek Orthodox Christians living in Istanbul 
and Muslims living in Western Thrace.7 As a result of the Mübadele, the percentage 
of non-Muslims to the rest of the population shrank from 20 per cent (before 
WWI) to 2.5 per cent in 1924 (Keyder 1989). Non-Muslim subjects of the former 
Ottoman Empire who stayed within the territorial boundaries of the new Republic 
were included in the new citizenship regime.
Subjecting citizens to state-directed movement and (re)settlement measures 
was by far the most far-reaching aspect of spatial practices of this era. During 
this period, Ankara governments passed two settlement laws governing who can 
immigrate to Turkey and become a citizen, and where citizens were allowed to 
(re)settle. In 1926, Law on Settlement No. 885 was adopted (Düstur, Tertip. 3, 
Cilt. 7, pp. 1441–1443). This law remained in effect until the more extensive 
Law on Settlement No. 2510 was codified in 1934 (Düstur, Tertip.3, Cilt.15, pp. 
1156–1175).
Article No. 2 of the 1926 Law of Settlement addressed the newly arriving 
immigrants. The law stated that people who did not belong to the ‘Turkish culture’ 
could not be admitted as immigrants or refugees. The centrality of concerns with 
language was due to the linguistic make-up of Turkey’s citizenry at the time.8 
Not all immigrants arriving between 1923 and 1950 were Turkish speakers. In 
an attempt to create a unified body politic, Turkish-speaking immigrants were 
directed to settle in places where they were expected to help with diluting the 
non-Turkish speaking population. Non-Turkish-speaking immigrants, in turn, 
were settled in places that would help with their integration. The only exception 
to this practice was the settlement of Turkish-speaking immigrants in ‘security-
sensitive’ areas (as with Eastern Thrace, on the border of Greece and Bulgaria). 
Turkey’s leaders clearly considered being a Turkish-speaker a central aspect of 
the Republic’s citizen imaginary. Those who did not fit or approximate this aspect 
of the imaginary were viewed as less trustworthy than those who did.9
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The Law on Settlement No. 2510 was less about settling the newly arrived 
immigrants as it was about (re)settling non-Turkish speaking and non-Muslim 
citizens of the Republic. Article No. 2 of the 1934 law read:
Turkey is divided into three settlement zones: zone 1 are the areas deemed to 
be where the population of Turkish culture is dense … zone 2 are the areas 
separated for the migration and settlement of the population deemed to be 
assimilated into Turkish culture … zone 3 are the areas where settlement is 
prohibited owing to reasons related to health, economy, culture, politics, the 
military and security. 
(Düstur, Tertip.3, Cilt.15, pp. 1156)
By way of dividing the country into three zones and (re)settling citizens based 
on their proximity to ‘Turkish culture’, the 1934 law sought, to quote GNA 
lawmakers, to ‘create a country speaking with one language, thinking in the same 
way and sharing the same sentiment’ (ülker 2008).
Whereas the Turkish language constituted the key component of the ‘Turkish 
culture’ as operationalized by the 1926 law, the 1934 law put emphasis on 
‘lifestyle’. Article No.10 targeted the lifestyle of non-Turkish speaking nomads 
in general and the Kurds in particular and abolished all previously documented 
and recognized rights of tribal chiefdoms and sheikhdoms. Between 1934 and 
1947, 25,831 people in 5,074 households from Tunceli, Erzincan, Bitlis, Siirt, 
van, Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Ağrı, Muş, Erzurum, Elazığ, Kars, Malatya, Mardin and 
Çoruh (Artvin) were resettled in other parts of Anatolia. Of these towns, only 
Çoruh is on the Black Sea coast and was home to Hemshins, a Muslim nomadic 
community of Armenian-speakers. The Hemshins were transferred from Çoruh 
into internal regions. All of the other towns are located in eastern and southeastern 
Anatolia, and were, at the time, home to mostly Kurdish-speakers.10
Accompanying the two settlement laws were practices that sought to (re)
territorialize identity by allowing the newly settled citizens to convert material 
culture. The Republican leaders had chosen to settle the muhacir in places vacated 
by the Armenian and Greek Orthodox subjects of the former Ottoman Empire, and 
gave these re-populated places a makeover. In the process, the remnants of past 
inhabitants were erased and the memories of those who were left behind were hurt.
Another aspect of spatial practices adopted during this period was the changing 
of place names. During the War of National Liberation, place names were 
changed mostly for emotive reasons, as with newly liberated towns wishing to 
(re)claim space (Öktem 2008). The changing of place names became a feature 
of Republican leaders’ practices only after the break-up of Kurdish rebellions 
in southeastern Anatolia. During this period, renaming of places was not limited 
to Greek or Armenian place names but also encompassed those in Arabic and 
Kurdish as well. These changes were followed by further rebellions and eventually 
resulted in a major military operation in 1937, which left thousands dead and 
wounded. Hundreds of others were relocated to the Elazığ plain, a region that was 
considered easier to ‘control’.11
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To recapitulate, spatial practices of citizenship adopted during this period 
were ultimately designed to (re)territorialize identity in Turkey. The desire to 
create a unified body politic through managing immigrant flows and their areas of 
settlement was unmistakable. However, (re)settlement of peoples were not isolated 
to immigrants but all those who had thus far failed to approximate the citizen 
imaginary. Indeed, the citizen imaginary of the Republic was forcibly imposed on 
peoples who were brought up in a nomadic lifestyle. Such imposition of a settled 
lifestyle, while allowing for the provisioning of peoples in terms of access to health 
services and education, at the same time rendered apparent the limits of recognition 
of and respect for (linguistic and lifestyle) difference in the new Republic’s citizen 
imaginary.12
Another significant body of practices was adopted in the realm of economy 
and targeted mostly ‘minority’ citizens. By the time the Republic of Turkey was 
founded, most of capital and business (including strategic industry and transportation 
networks) was in the hands of international capital and minority citizens (Keyder 
1989). The muhacir, some of whom had been affluent at home, had not always 
been able to bring their capital with them and thus had to start their businesses 
from scratch (Tekeli 1990). During this period, the Republican leaders scrambled to 
generate job opportunities for the muhacir while seeking to transfer the control of 
the economy into the hands of the state and the newly emerging bourgeoisie.
The context to these practices was set by the destructive effects of successive 
wars; lingering memories of the final years of the Empire and the Capitulations; the 
1929 Great Depression; the onset of World War II (WWII) and measures adopted 
towards mobilization for the war. There were three main aspects to economic 
practices of citizenship during 1923–1946: the barring of minority citizens from 
civil service positions and various private sector jobs; encouraging (if not obliging) 
private business owners (minority and international capital) to employ Turkish 
speakers; and the ‘Wealth Tax’ (Varlık Vergisi) of 1942.
We start with the barring of minority citizens from civil service positions and 
some private sector jobs: before 1926, minority citizens were only de facto barred 
from civil service positions; in 1926 their disbarment became de jure. On 18 March 
1926, with Article No. 4 of the Civil Service Law No. 788 it was decreed that all 
civil servants must be ‘Turkish’ (Düstur, Tertip. 3, Cilt. 7, p. 669). In the early 
1930s, a group of private sector jobs were also declared to be off limits to non-
Turkish speakers (many of whom were minority citizens).
Another aspect of economic practices addressed the private sector. On 10 April 
1926, the GNA passed a law stipulating that all companies must keep their records in 
Turkish. On 22 April 1926, another law was passed, stating that ‘businesses should 
use the Turkish language’ (Aktar 2002, p.117). In so doing, the government was 
obligating private businesses owned by minority citizens and international capital to 
replace the non-Turkish speakers with Turkish speakers. Taken together these two 
sets of practices aimed at transferring private sector jobs away from non-Turkish 
speakers while at the same time barring them from civil service jobs.
Third, the so-called Wealth Tax was introduced on 11 November 1942 (Resmi 
Gazete 1942, pp. 3965–3968). At the time of its introduction, the Wealth Tax 
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was offered as an instrument of ‘social justice’, adopted to transfer wealth away 
from ‘war profiteers’ and help the poor by bringing inflation down. While Turkey 
had remained neutral during WWII, in 1939 approximately 1 million peasants 
and agricultural workers were called up for military service. This resulted in the 
rocketing of agricultural prices throughout the country, but overwhelmingly in the 
cities. In 1942 alone prices increased by approximately 350 per cent. While a great 
majority of Turkey’s citizens’ standard of living dropped dramatically, the thriving 
black market economy benefited some business owners, causing resentment against 
those who were portrayed as ‘war profiteers’. While not all ‘war profiteers’ were 
minority business owners, one could not always tell by government or media 
rhetoric (Akan 2011).
In İstanbul, where a majority of the minority citizens lived, taxpayers were 
divided into two separate lists: the ‘M’ list for Muslim citizens, and the ‘G’ list for 
non-Muslim citizens (Gayrimüslim). Later, two more categories were added: ‘E’ for 
non-citizens (Ecnebi) and ‘D’ for converts (Dönme). This last category comprised 
members of the Sabetaist sect of Jews who had converted to Islam during Ottoman 
times. Citizens who were categorized as ‘converts’ paid about twice as much as 
Muslim citizens, while non-Muslim citizens paid up to ten times as much. ‘E’ 
category taxpayers, on the other hand, were expected to pay on a scale close to ‘M’ 
category for fear of alienating international capital (Akar 1992; Aktar 2002).
The way in which the Wealth Tax was put into practice became a disgrace 
for to all those concerned. Tax assessments were made by local committees that 
consisted of local government officials, representatives of the local councils and of 
the chambers of commerce. No fixed rate was set. As a result, the tax burden was 
allowed to be borne almost wholly by business owners in the big cities, notably 
İstanbul, with 55 per cent of the total bill falling on minority citizens (Aktar 2002). 
To add to outrage, taxpayers were required to pay their taxes in cash and within 15 
days of receiving their assessments. This often meant that in order to cover the bill, 
they had to sell their businesses and/or property under their market value. Those 
who were unable to pay had to work off their debt in a labour camp set up in Aşkale, 
Erzurum in Eastern Anatolia. Out of 40,000 tax debtors across Turkey, about 1,400, 
all of whom were minority citizens, ended up in labour camps ((Akar 2006; Akan 
2011) cf. (Bali 2003)). The Wealth Tax was withdrawn in March 1944.
The combined effect of the economic practices of citizenship of this period was 
far reaching. As capital was transferred away from the minorities to the state and 
the newly emerging bourgeoisie, and jobs were secured for non-minority workers, 
minority citizens were insecured as they were discouraged from imagining their 
future in Turkey. Those who had other opportunities chose to leave.
Non-minority citizens also drew their lessons from the economic practices of 
the state: those who approximated the citizen imaginary were secured as they were 
rewarded economically via the transfer of jobs and capital. However, Turkey’s 
‘included’ citizens were also insecured as they became unable to live with difference 
(see below, Section III).
While spatial and economic practices were concentrated in the earlier years of the 
Republic and were gradually phased out from the late 1950s onwards, in the realm 
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of ‘culture’ successive governments adopted wide-ranging reforms some of which 
have found their way into the current (1980) constitution. In the 1920s, the new 
Republic’s cultural practices of citizenship had multiple components including the 
Turkish History thesis that sought to (re)claim space by writing it back into history 
and give a boost to citizens’ sense of ‘Turkishness’; language reform that involved 
the transition from the Arabic to the Roman alphabet and ridding Turkish of Arabic 
and Persian words; and changing peoples’ surnames into Turkish (Aytürk 2004). 
Most emblematic of them all for the purpose of this chapter is the introduction of 
a compulsory civic education course in primary and secondary schools. Since this 
course served the purpose of introducing, justifying and cementing all other cultural 
practices, this section of the chapter will focus on the civic education course.
The name of the civic education course was Yurt Bilgisi (Homeland Knowledge). 
The title of the course itself constituted an instance of claiming space for Turkey’s 
citizens. The course textbook was entitled Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (Civic 
Information for the Citizen) and was authored by Afet İnan, a historian and adopted 
daughter of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) (İnan 1931). At the time, İnan was teaching 
Yurt Bilgisi as well as history courses at secondary-school level. It is reported that 
Mustafa Kemal, upon seeing the Yurt Bilgisi textbook she was using, did not find it 
sufficient and asked her to write a new one. In the process, Mustafa Kemal ordered 
translations of French and German textbooks to be made, personally read them and 
gave dictation to İnan, thereby authoring significant portions of the book based on 
the synthesis he reached. Other textbooks were also produced during this period. 
In what follows, we focus on the İnan textbook, for its history as well as substance 
helps illustrate cultural citizenship practices of this period.
The 1931 textbook’s notion of citizenship was a ‘civic republican’ one, defining 
citizenship within the parameters of solidarism and community. Whereas the 
‘liberal’ definition of citizenship casts citizenship as a status involving rights 
accorded to citizens, the ‘civic republican’ definition casts it as a practice involving 
responsibilities to the wider society (Taylor 1989). Indeed, Mustafa Kemal had 
elsewhere explained the rationale for the civic education course as one of educating 
citizens about ‘the current duties and rights in their conduct of affairs among 
themselves and between them and the state, as well as general information on the 
organization of the state’ (İnan 1969, p. 7).
Given the course’s objective of fashioning ‘civilized’ and ‘modern’ citizens, 
who would be ‘obedient’ to the Republic (İnan 1931, p. 7), the textbook put more 
emphasis on the duties and obligations of citizens towards the state and less on 
citizens’ rights. İnan later explained such de-emphasis on rights with reference to 
Mustafa Kemal’s thinking that every right should be complemented by a duty (İnan 
1969, p. 8). Such emphasis on duty was expressed best by ziya Gökalp (1876–
1924), the foremost public intellectual of the late Ottoman era as follows: ‘Do not 
say ‘I have rights’;/ There is only duty, not right’ (Parla 1985, p. 68). Suitably, the 
book listed the most important duties of the citizens: paying taxes, participating in 
elections, and performing military service (for men). The demands of solidarism 
and community meant the right to vote and get elected were represented as duties 
and not rights. The 1931 textbook reminded the students that since citizens live in 
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a community where solidarity is crucial, they should take utmost care in making 
decisions that concerned common interests (İnan 1931, p. 128). At the time Turkey 
still had a single party system, but the students were being advised to vote in a 
virtuous manner.
The Republican motto of this era, ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’, was 
inscribed into students’ worldview through the civic education textbook. The 
text’s emphasis on ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’ translated into a less than 
accepting attitude towards all those who failed to approximate the Republic’s citizen 
imaginary. Regarding the non-Turkish speakers, the textbook said:
In the current political and social unity of the Turkish nation, some of our 
citizens are being encouraged to adopt a Kurdish, Circassian, Laz or Bosnian 
identity, but these misnomers, which are remnants of an autocratic period 
from the past, have caused nothing but misery among these individuals, with 
the exception of a backwards and brainless few. For these members of the 
nation also share the same common past, history, ethics and law. 
(İnan 1931, p. 16)
Here is what the book said about the minority citizens:
Under the noble ethics of the Turkish nation, who could expect these citizens 
of christian [sic] and jewish [sic] origin to be looked down upon as ‘foreigner’ 
as long as they have willingly tied themselves to the Turkish nation? 
(İnan 1931, p. 16)
That the nature of the relations with the minorities was described in terms of 
tolerance and hospitality but not recognition or equality gave away the textbook’s 
limitations in recognizing and/or respecting difference. Peoples of myriad 
religious and/or ethnic origins could become ‘included’. The ticket of entry was 
willingness to approximate the Republic’s citizen imaginary. Such willingness 
was to be exhibited through checking one’s ‘differences’ at the door. As such, 
besides serving an educational purpose, the textbook also constituted an instance 
of the Republican leadership’s stratagem for bolstering the new state and creating 
a ‘cohesive’ body of citizens.
To recapitulate, the citizen imaginary of the Republic was written in the civic 
education textbook more by his/her duties than his/her rights. Emphasis was placed 
on solidarism and community but not individual rights and liberties. As with other 
newly founded nation-states, in Turkey, too, the citizen was ‘regarded as, at best, 
an eventually educable ward and, at worst, someone prone to derail the national 
journey with his irrational and provincial proclivities’ (Krishna 1999, p.15).
The foregoing outlined the predicament of Turkey’s ‘included/excluded’ citizens 
who were (in)secured as a consequence of spatial, economic and cultural practices 
of successive Ankara governments. Different from the prevailing accounts, we 
pointed to the ways in which same practices have secured and insecured the same 
body of citizens, albeit in different ways and to different degrees. What often goes 
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unacknowledged is that the practices that (in)secured Turkey’s citizens were not 
always governmental but also practices adopted by the ‘included’. In Section III, 
we highlight another overlooked aspect of Turkey’s citizens’ experiences, the 
‘included’ who experienced ontological (in)security. That some ‘included’ citizens 
also participated in activities that insecured their fellow citizens further complicates 
the already complex (in)securing predicament of Turkey’s citizens.
Ontological (in)security of ‘the included’
Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens, as products of the citizen imaginary of the Republic, 
were (in)secured as they became unable to address difference without turning it into 
otherness – to paraphrase William Connolly (1991). This section focuses upon the 
ways in which ‘the included’ were (in)secured as some of them evolved into agents 
of (in)security towards the ‘included/excluded’ while others were complicit in their 
silence. What follows outlines the so-called ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaign. 
The campaign was particularly significant in that it was not the Ankara government, 
but citizens’ groups who organized the campaign. While social groups (including 
NGOs) got involved in the economic practices directed against minorities (as with the 
petition of the Waiters’ Association, or the newly created bourgeoisie’s connivance 
in the making of the Wealth Tax, see above) a wider group of individuals and social 
groups were involved in the case of the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns.
It may come across as counterintuitive to consider ‘the included’ as anything 
other than ‘secure’, chiefly in view of how some of them emerged as agents of 
insecurity vis-à-vis fellow citizens. Be that as it may, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ 
rigid responses to expressions of ‘difference’ could be viewed as an instance of 
their ontological (in)security. The notion of ‘ontological security’ refers to security 
of an individual’s identity; his/her drive to maintain who s/he is when faced with 
challenges (McSweeney 1999; Mitzen 2006b; Mitzen 2006a; Steele 2005; Steele 
2008). In the face of challenges, individuals routinize their behaviour. They do this 
in an attempt to avoid questioning their sense of self each and every time such a 
challenge occurs. In maintaining their routines, some individuals are more rigid/
flexible than others. While those who are more ‘rigid’ remain attached to their 
routines regardless of the challenges they are facing, those who are more ‘flexible’ 
are able to question their routines and adapt as necessary.
Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ rigid responses to expressions of ‘difference’ (as 
evinced by individuals’ and social groups’ active participation in the ‘Citizen, 
Speak Turkish!’ campaigns, or their silence about insecurities experienced by 
minority citizens during the so-called ‘Wealth Tax’ incident of 1942)13 could be 
viewed as an instance of their ontological (in)security. Since Turkey’s ‘included’ 
citizens’ sense of self was a product of a social imaginary that is not accepting of 
‘difference’, they came to view expressions of resistance to the citizen imaginary 
as a challenge to their sense of self. Accordingly, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens’ 
indifference towards (if not agency in the production of) insecurities of fellow 
citizens, as will be illustrated below, could be viewed as an instance of their 
ontological (in)security.
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The ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns emerged in a context shaped by cultural 
practices of the Republican leadership. That the campaigns were designed and 
executed by non-governmental actors highlighted the limits of recognition of and 
respect for difference among ‘the included’. The first step in the ‘Citizen, Speak 
Turkish!’ campaigns was taken by the Students’ Association of the Faculty of Law 
in İstanbul. On 13 January 1928, the Students’ Association organized a campaign 
aimed at preventing the use of languages other than Turkish in public places (Bali 
2003, p. 135). The students put up signs and accosted people speaking foreign 
languages in public places. The signs read: ‘We cannot say Turk to people who do 
not speak Turkish’ (Bali 2003, p. 270). The campaign led to tension and conflict, 
as it did not merely suggest that everyone in Turkey should speak Turkish, but it 
actually threatened non-Muslims in an attempt to make them speak Turkish. Some 
activists instigated court cases against non-Muslims who spoke languages other than 
Turkish, citing Article 159 of the Turkish Penal Code about ‘insulting Turkishness’ 
as their legal justification (Orhon 1941, pp. 1–3). Some went insofar as to call for, 
‘Either speak Turkish or leave the country’.
While the ‘Citizen, speak Turkish!’ campaigns were entirely in line with what 
the Republican leaders encouraged under the slogan ‘one language, one culture, 
one ideal’, the forceful methods utilized by the youth was disapproved by Ankara 
as voiced in the media. As the campaigns turned violent, the government intervened 
and called for a halt (Aslan 2007). Still, various non-governmental actors throughout 
the country revived these campaigns well until the 1940s.
By the end of the ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ campaigns, Jewish communities in 
Bursa, Edirne and Kırklareli adopted Turkish as their ‘native tongue’ (Orhon 1941, 
p.107). The Christian community followed suit and, in 1935, Monsignor Angelo 
Giuseppe Roncalli, then the Catholic Church’s apostolic delegate in İstanbul and 
later the reformist Pope John XXIII, preached sermons in Turkish for the first time 
(Bali 2003, p. 273). During the 1940s, the number of citizens who could be spotted 
by the language they spoke was decreasing sharply (Bali 2003, p. 140).
What was significant about these campaigns for the purposes of this chapter is the 
way it revealed the (active) agency as well as (passive) complicity of individuals and 
social groups in (in)securing fellow citizens. It was not only the Students’ Association 
or Turkish Hearths but also people in the street who were a party to the campaigns.
To recapitulate, early Republican citizen imaginary sought to produce a body 
of citizens that subscribed to ‘one language, one culture, one ideal’. What we call 
Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens are peoples of myriad origins who learnt to check their 
‘difference’ at the door as they entered the public realm and be ‘successfully’ moulded 
into the citizen imaginary of the Republic. In the process, however, ‘the included’ 
adopted rigid responses to expressions of ‘difference’ as evinced by individuals’ 
and social groups’ active participation in the ‘Citizen! Speak Turkish!’ campaigns 
or their complicity in silence about insecurities experienced by minority citizens 
during the so-called ‘Wealth Tax’ incident of 1942. That said, such participation (be 
it active or passive) in (in)securing fellow citizens could be read as an instance of 
‘included’ citizens’ ontological (in)security. As such, Turkey’s ‘included’ citizens 
emerged as both agents and referents of in/security in the early Republican period.
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Conclusion
Our everyday notions of security and citizenship rest on a binary that defines 
lack of access to citizenship as insecurity. Be that as it may, it is possible for 
peoples to be (in)secured as they become citizens. This is not to underestimate 
the significance of Turkey’s Republican transformation. Nor is it to overlook the 
ways in which citizenship allowed betterment to the lives of Turkey’s peoples. 
Rather, what the chapter has sought to highlight is the ways in which the transition 
from subjecthood to citizenship is less a moment of security than a process of (in)
securing through which citizens experience security as well as insecurity.
In Turkey’s context, what subverted citizens’ rights was Republican leaders’ 
remembrance of the Capitulations and the post-WWI attempts by European great 
powers to break up the Ottoman Empire warranted by their claim to ‘better’ 
rule. In the attempt to create a strong, independent sovereign nation-state and 
thereby removing the grounds for external intervention, Republican leaders 
utilized citizenship as an idea, as an institution and as a discourse. While doing 
so, they adopted policies that did not always treat people as citizens with rights 
who participate in their own governance but as populations who are the subject 
of policy (Chatterjee 2004), hence our preference for a threefold categorization of 
‘excluded’, ‘included/excluded’ and ‘included’ in understanding early Republican 
citizenship practices. This categorization, and the notion of ‘included/excluded’ 
in particular, allows us to understand the ways in which myriad peoples were (in)
secured in the transition from subjecthood to citizenship.
In offering this argument, we differ from the prevailing accounts in two ways. 
First, we analyse early Republican practices as in/securing of Turkey’s citizens, 
i.e. considering multiple ways in which the same body of citizens were secured 
and insecured. Second, we look at the ontological (in)security of a body of citizens 
who are assumed to be secure and therefore explained away. Indeed, it is often the 
predicament of the minorities that is examined by prevailing accounts (by virtue 
of the gap between what the 1924 Constitution provided and what actual practices 
resulted in). However, it was not only minority citizens who were (in)secured 
but also those who sought to approximate the citizen imaginary, the ‘included’. 
The latter experienced ontological (in)security in that they had to check their 
differences at the door as the price for entry into the public realm to exercise their 
citizenship rights, thereby becoming less-than-able to live with ‘difference’.
Notes
 1 Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the Workshop on ‘Ontological 
Security and Conflict Resolution’, Koç University, March 2013 and CRASSH 
Conference on ‘Dismantling Security’, University of Cambridge, June 2012. The 
authors would like to thank conference/workshop organizers and participants for their 
comments and advice.
 2 We have chosen to limit our analysis to the single party period (1923–1946) not because 
we consider the transition to multi-party regime (in 1946) to have brought about 
significant changes in Turkey’s citizenship regime. Rather, focusing on this early period 
allows dissecting (in)securities tied up with this process of transition.
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 3 Compare Indian (Krishna 1999), Turkish and Finnish experiences (Joenniemi Chapter 
7) in terms of conjectural similarities and ‘cultural’ differences.
 4 The Treaty of Lausanne accorded juridical ‘minority’ status to Armenian and Jewish 
peoples as well as Greek Orthodox Christians some of whom were exempted from 
the population exchange. No other peoples were recognized as minorities by law. For 
example, Antioch Rum Orthodox Christians and Syrian Orthodox Christians (Süryani 
peoples) were not accorded minority status.
 5 The emerging literature on Kurds in Turkey may be considered an exception to this 
generalization. The following understand their predicament as an aspect of (in)securing 
citizens in the early Republican era.
 6 Issued on 17 February 1920 by the last Ottoman Chamber of deputies meeting secretly 
in İstanbul, which was then under allied occupation, Misak-ıMilli (National Pact) is a 
document expressing the nation’s will to (re)gain sovereignty and independence.
 7 Article 1 of the agreement read: ‘Turkish citizens living in Turkish territories would be 
exchanged with Muslim Greek citizens living in Greek territories starting from May 
1923, and that none of them could return to the places they formerly lived without the 
permission of the respective governments’. The agreement specifically exempted from 
the exchange Greeks living İstanbul (about 100,000) and Muslims in Western Thrace 
(Hirschon 2005, p. 3).
 8 ‘According to the national census of 1927, Turkish was not the native language of 
around 28 percent of the city’s [İstanbul] population’ (Aslan 2007, p. 250).
 9 While the Republic embraced secularism early on, Islam continued to play a role if not 
overtly, in defining the citizen body. An instance of the centrality of Muslimhood to 
the Republican leadership’s concept of ‘Turkishness’ was observed when the Turkish-
speaking Gagauz requested to emigrate to Turkey from Russia. They were not allowed 
in by virtue of their Christianity, for the Republican leaders believed that it would be 
difficult to ‘assimilate’ them (Somel 1997, p.91).
 10 In the case of those who were forced to resettle for security reasons following uprisings 
in 1925 and 1937, their lands in zone 3 were confiscated and were directed to resettle in 
zone 2. Following the transition to a multi-party regime in 1946, those who were forced 
to migrate in the 1930s were allowed to return with a law passed in late 1940s (Tekeli 
1990).
 11 During the 1940s, preparations began to be made for a large-scale name change action 
throughout the country. With Law No. 5542 passed in 1949, such changes were given a 
legal basis in national legislation (Öktem 2008).
 12 Mesut Yeğen (1999) reads the term lifestyle as a code word for Kurdish in the official 
lexicon. That said, such an unaccepting attitude towards different lifestyles constitutes 
an instance of (in)securing for all nomads. While (re)settlement allowed access to 
education and healthcare, at the same time it erased nomadic aspects of culture.
 13 Equally significant is the so-called 6–7 September riots against non-Muslims in 1955.
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